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WELSH v. UNITED STATES, THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GIVES A
PHYSICS LESSON -- FOR EVERY ACTION THERE IS AN
EQUAL AND OPPOSITE REACTION
INTRODUCTION
For each action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.' So it is in the science
of physics, and likewise in the law. If a person receives a personal injury, the law
of tort provides a remedy. Similarly, a breach of promise is remedied by the law of
contracts. The commonality of these situations, analogous to physics, is that an in-
dividual's injurious act causes a reaction in the judicial system. In Welsh v. United
States,2 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reacted to negligent spoliation3 of
evidence in a medical malpractice case.
In Welsh, a plaintiff-executrix filed a medical malpractice action against the
United States.4 As a result of the defendant's negligent disposal of a part of the
decedent's skull, the plaintiff was precluded from directly proving several elements
of her case.' This is thefirst case in which a federal appeals court has attempted to
remedy the problem of negligent spoliation of evidence in civil litigation. The court
of appeals, sitting in a diversity action, reviewed decisions of the Kentucky courts,
analogous federal opinions, and leading opinions from other jurisdictions, in devel-
oping its approach to the issue. In drafting the Welsh opinion, the sixth circuit joined
a growing movement which attempts to protect the judicial process and litigants
from the harmful effects of the spoliation of evidence. In adopting this protective
stance, the court served notice to potential spoliators that they bear the risk of their
own conduct, and will not benefit by destroying evidence. 6
This casenote will review the facts of Welsh and present the current judicial
approaches to spoliation of evidence in civil litigation. Second, the note will analyze
the Welsh court's proposed solution to the spoliation problem. Finally, the note will
discuss the use of the Welsh approach in litigation and management implications for
health care facilities.
'J. THiis, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF PHYSICS (1973).
2844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988). This casenote is concerned with Judge Merritt's opinion which focused on
the spoliation issue. Although the district court's decision was affirmed, the court of appeals decision was
not unanimous. Judge Merritt affirmed on separate grounds; Judge Nelson affirmed the trial court's findings;
and Judge Welford reversed the trial court.
I Spoliation is the destruction or alteration of evidence. In effect, it is an obstruction of justice BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1257 (5th ed. 1979).
'Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1240. The United States operates the Veteran's Administration Clinic involved in Welsh.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1243. The negligence and proximate cause elements lacked direct proof. Id.
Id. at 1249.
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FACTS
Francis Welsh was admitted to the Veteran's Administration (VA) Medical
Center (clinic) in Lexington, Kentucky on May 27, 1980. 7 Welsh complained of
various psychological and physical ailments.8 VA doctors ran tests and discovered
a brain tumor.9 The doctors removed the tumor on June 9, 1980.'0 The procedure
required the surgeons to make an incision in the scalp and bore through the skull
bone."' The procedure created a skull flap where the surgeons entered into the skull
cavity.' 2 After removing the tumor, the surgeons replaced the skull flap, and
concluded the procedure. 3
Between July and September, Welsh returned to the clinic either two or four
times. 4 On August 22, the clinic staff received an unscheduled visit from Welsh. 5
Again Welsh complained of weakness and nausea. 16 The resident surgeon noted a
problem and scheduled a diagnostic test for October. 7 Despite all of Welsh's
complaints, the staff neglected to take his temperature. 8
On September 25, Welsh reappeared at the clinic. 19 The record reflects that the
clinic's staff again failed to fully investigate Welsh's complaints.20
Welsh made his scheduled visit to the clinic on October 10.21 Once again, he
7 Id. at 1240.
Id. The decedent was experiencing depression, loss of appetite and memory, fatigue, and headaches. Id.
Id.
10 Id.
1Id.
'2 Id. This skull flap is the critical piece of evidence which ultimately became the centerpiece of Judge
Merritt's opinion.
13 Id.
"4 Id. The number of visits was disputed by the VA clinic because there was an absence of records for both
the July 9 and September 25 visits. The first visit was on July 9. This visit was disputed by the VA. The
second visit was on July 15. Welsh voiced symptoms similar to his pre-operative condition. See supra note
8. There was sparse documentation of these complaints in clinic records. Despite these alleged complaints,
the attending physician merely scheduled the decedent for a return visit in 3 months. Id.
'" Id. This visit is also disputed by the clinic. See supra note 14. The district court made a finding of fact
that the visit did occur. Id.
16/d.
17 Id.
" Id. The district court noted in its findings of fact, based on medical testimony, that the failure to take the
decedent's temperature with knowledge of his symptoms was negligent. (District Court Opinion at p.8) This
oversight is the focal point of Judge Nelson's concurring opinion. Id. at 1249-51. When the basic relationship
between a bacterial infection and a high temperature is understood, the role of Welsh's temperature becomes
apparent. When the body fights off infection, the internal body temperature rises. Thus, the Court implied
that if the temperature had been taken, a high temperature would have been observed, prompted further tests
and, ultimately, discovery of the infection before it caused brain damage. Id. at 1242.
'9 Id. at 1240.
2
" Id.
21 Id.
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expressed his ailments to the staff.22 The staff repeated its prior conduct and failed
to take Welsh's temperature. 21The VA doctor ran several tests and the results of each
were within normal limits. 2 a Welsh left the clinic after those tests.25 However, his
condition worsened before the day was over. 26 His family brought him back to the
clinic that nighty.2 At that time, the staff finally took Welsh's temperature. 28
On October 11, the doctors investigated the area under the original surgical
incision.29 The investigation revealed bacterial infection (i.e., pus).3" The VA's
infectious disease consultants recommended a deeper exploration to search for
infection near the brain surface. 3' Despite Welsh's condition, the recommendation
was put off until October 15.32
On October 14, the doctor's repeated a test originally given on October 10.33
That procedure revealed a "crescent." 3 4 This result, combined with the consultant's
recommendation, spurred the exploration of the brain surface for infection on
October 15.35 This procedure required the surgeons to proceed through the original
incision into the skull and, consequently, remove the skull flap.3 6 Then, in direct
contradiction of clinic regulations, the surgeons threw the flap away,37 making
pathological analysis of the skull flap impossible. 31
The October 15th procedure led to the discovery of a subdural empyema. 9
Subsequently, Welsh received an antibiotic treatment which cured the infection. 40
Nonetheless, the infection had already caused permanent brain damage.4' Welsh
remained in a semi-coma from October 1980 until his death in May 1985.42
22 Id.
21 Id. The geometric progression of the infection makes the relation of high temperature (e.g., fever) to
infection critical at this time. The longer it takes to discover the infection, the greater its growth. Id. at 1250
(Nelson, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 1240.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 
Id.
21 Id. The first reading showed a temperature of 102 degrees; the second, 104.6 degrees. Id.
21 Id. Doctors took a needle tap of the area directly beneath the original incision. Id.
10 Id. at 1240-41. The formation of pus is a byproduct of bacterial infection. STEOMAN'S MEDICAi. DICTIONARY
1047 (3rd ed. 1972).
1' Id. at 1240. A localized collection of pus near the brain surface is a subdural empyema. Id.
32 Id. at 1241.
11 Id. The doctor ordered a computed tomography (CT) study of the head. Id.
-1 Id. This "crescent" is symptomatic of the presence of a subdural empyema. See supra note 31.
35 Id.
36 Id.
31 Id. This precluded plaintiff from presenting direct proofof the infection's cause and duration. Id. at 1243.
31 Id. Pathological analysis would have provided conclusive proof of both the duration and cause of the
infection. Id. at 1242.
39 Id.
Id.
4' Id.
4
' ld.
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In 1982, Nellie Welsh, the decedent's wife, filed an administrative claim with
the VA.43 The VA denied her claim.44 Subsequently, Nellie Welsh filed a wrongful
death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act,45 in United States District Court
(Eastern District of Kentucky). 6 In a bench trial, the district court awarded damages
to her.47 In reaching its decision, the district court drew a host of adverse inferences
against the VA.48 The court drew the inferences because the VA misplaced medical
records, deviated from standard procedures, failed to analyze the skull flap, and
failed to present any unbiased expert witnesses.
49
The failure to diagnose and treat the infection on September 25 and October 10
were found to be negligent acts and the proximate cause of Welsh's death. 0
The court of appeals affirmed. 5' The appellate court opinion was based on
grounds not found in the district court's opinion. 2 The appellate court decided that
in light of Nellie Welsh's missing proof (the skull flap), a rebuttable presumption
should be utilized.5 3  In doing so, the court shifted the burden of proof (i.e.,
persuasion), which the plaintiff normally carries, to the defendant.14 The court relied
on Federal Rule of Evidence 30251 to link Nellie Welsh's missing proof with the need
for a presumption. 56 In effect, the court has created a new approach to resolving
problems in negligent spoliation cases.
The court developed the rebuttable presumption based not only on the facts
presented, but on a survey of approaches to the spoliation issue.51 Public Health
Trust ofDade County v. Valcin 58 is the leading case dealing with negligent spoliation
in malpractice suits. In Valcin, the plaintiff filed a malpractice action against the
hospital. 59 The plaintiff was unable to prove negligence because her medical file did
not contain the operative notes of a sterilization procedure. 6' The Valcin court
43 Id.
4 Id
15 Id. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.S. 2671 (Law. Co-op 1977).
'Id.
11 Id. at 1239.
11 Id. at 1242.
4
9 Id.
50 Id.
SI See supra note 2.
52 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1249.
53 Id. at 1248.
14 Id. at 1249.
" FED. R. EvtD. 302 reads in relevant part: Applicability of State Law in Civil Actions and Proceedings - In
civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim
or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law.
Thus, the rule provides a need to predict the Kentucky courts' position on the use of presumptions in
a spoliation case.
51 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1243.
51 Id. at 1246-49. See infra notes 66-160.
" 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
Id. at 596.
6 Id. at 597.
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adopted the use of a rebuttable presumption against the negligent spoliator.61 That
presumption, based on social policy, shifted both the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion to the spoliator.
62
The Welsh court adopted an approach identical to that in Valcin.63 Reviewing
the facts presented and Kentucky's substantive law on res ipsa loquitor and
presumptions, 6' the court found that the use of a rebuttable presumption against the
VA was warranted. The court cautioned that: "the strength of the inference
allowable will vary according to the facts and evidentiary posture of a given case.
Whether the defendant's actions may result or must result in an inference that the
missing evidence would be unfavorable to the spoliator or result merely in a burden
shifting presumption, will depend upon a case by case analysis."
6
BACKGROUND
Spoliation of evidence in civil litigation has been the subject of judicial
scrutiny in recent years. 66 The destruction of evidence has adverse consequences on
both the judicial system and the opposing party. 6 The courts have attempted to curb
this growing problem through a variety of methods.
68
Tort Remedies
The principle underlying the development of torts to remedy spoliation is that
''a prospective civil action ...is a valuable probable expectancy' that the court must
protect from... interference .... ,69 Regardless of whether the destructive act is
intentional or negligent, it is the protection of the opposing party's interest in their
cause of action that is the centerpiece of the tort. Currently, two spoliation torts are
recognized in civil litigation: intentional7 ° and negligent7' spoliation of evidence.
61 Id. at 599.
62 Id. at 599-601.
1, Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248-49.64 Id. at 1248.
69 Id. at 1247.
6 See Comment, Spoliation: Civil Liability for Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. Rico. L. REV. 191 (1985)
(hereinafter, Civil Liability); Note, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional Spoliation of
Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961 (1985); Note, Evidence: IntentionallyDestroyedMedicalRecordsGive Rise
to an Irrebuttable Presumption of Malpractice, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 197 (1985); Note, Torts - Arizona Should
Adopt the Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence - LaRaia v. Superior Court, 150Ariz. 118,722 P. 2d286
(/ 986), 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 371 (1987) (hereinafter, Torts); Comment, Spoliation of Evidence - Recognition for
a New Tort, 15 WEsT. ST. L. RiEv. 359 (1987). See infra notes 69-160.
67 Civil Liability, supra note 66, at 191.
Note, Torts. supra note 66, at 191.
69 Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491. 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (1984).
70 See infra notes 72-87.
7' See infra notes 88-97.
AtoTEsWinter, 19891
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1) Interference with Civil Litigation by Intentional Spoliation of Evidence
This tort of intentional spoliation owes its existence to the California Court
system. In Smith v. Superior Court,7 2 the California Court of Appeals analogized the
spoliator's effect on litigation to a person's tortious interference with a business
relationship.73
The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective
litigation by spoliation of evidence are:7 4 ( 1) the existence of a potentially successful
lawsuit, (2) the spoliator's knowledge of the potential lawsuit, (3) the spoliator's
intentional actions to destroy or alter evidence necessary to the lawsuit, (4) the
spoliation of evidence, and (5) the impairment of the plaintiff's ability to proceed in
the litigation because of the spoliation.
All of these elements were present in Smith. The plaintiff, Phyllis Smith, was
permanently blinded when the wheel flew off of an on-coming van and shattered her
windshield. " The company that customized the van's wheels, Abbott Ford, towed
the van to its dealership. 76 Smith's attorney made an agreement with Abbott Ford.77
Abbott Ford agreed to keep certain van parts for evidence while Smith's attorney in-
vestigated incidental matters.78 Subsequently, Abbott Ford destroyed, lost, or
transferred the van parts which made it impossible for Smith's experts to inspect
those parts. 7 That loss of evidence substantially impaired Smith's ability to prove
her cause of action against Abbott Ford and several co-defendants. 1o Consequently,
Smith brought suit against Abbott Ford for "tortious interference with prospective
civil action by spoliation of evidence."'" The California Court of Appeals empha-
sized that a person's prospective civil action is a "probable expectancy" 8 2 entitled
to legal protection from a spoliator's interference.
California"3 and Alaska 4 have accepted the tort of intentional spoliation.
Kansas, 5 Arizona 6 and Illinois5 7 have addressed the tort, but have neither accepted
72 See supra note 69.
71 Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court equated the spoliator's effect on the
probable success of a lawsuit with the intentional interference with prospective business relationships. Id.
71 See, e.g., Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 66, at 200-01; Note, Torts, supra note 66, at 375.
71 Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
"See Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1205,228 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1985). The case names
potential defendants to the Smith's suit (Sears, Roebuck & Co., Ford Motor Co., and the van driver). Id.
11 Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 495, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 83 1.
'2 Id. at 502, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
83 See supra notes 69-82.
14 Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
" Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987).
16 LaRaia v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 118, 722 P.2d 286 (1986).
17 Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248, 501 N.E.2d 1312 (1986).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3
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nor rejected it.
2) Negligent Interference with Civil Litigation by Spoliation of Evidence
The elements of the negligent spoliation tort follow the traditional negligence
pattern:"8 (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the
breach of duty.
In Fox v. Cohen,"9 the administrator of an estate filed a wrongful death action.
The plaintiff alleged three counts in his complaint:9" (1) medical malpractice; (2)
negligence in losing, destroying, or misplacing the decedent's medical records, and
(3) conspiracy to destroy the records. The court held that pleading a negligence cause
of action mandated a showing of the defendant's duty owed to the plaintiff, breach
of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach.9
The Fox decision implicated Illinois Statutes, Illinois Department of Public
Health Regulations, and American Hospital Regulation standards in the creation of
a duty to maintain medical records. 9 In spite of the presence of a duty and a
corresponding breach, the court dismissed counts two and three because the plaintiff
had not yet suffered damages. 93 The court explained that there were no damages
because the plai.ntiff had not lost his malpractice suit.94
California,95 Florida, 96and Illinois97 currently recognize the negligent spolia-
tion tort.
Non-Tort Remedies
Spoliation can also be attacked through various non-tort means.9 These are
utilized primarily to protect the injured party's cause of action or defense. 99 Rules
of civil procedure,'0° criminal sanctions,'0 ' and the use of adverse inferences and
presumptions' 2 are common methods of addressing spoliation.
g Note, Torts, supra note 66, at 379 & nn. 113-148.
x' 84 111. App. 3d 744, 406 N.E.2d 178 (1980).
9( Id. at 745, 406 N.E.2d at 179.
91 Id. at 746, 406 N.E.2d at 179.
92 Id. at 749-50, 406 N.E.2d at 181.
91Id. at 751,406 N.E.2d at 183.
9 Id.
91 Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance, Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1985).
Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
9 See supra notes 89-94.
9 See infra notes 103-160.
99 See Note, Torts, supra note 66, at 66 & n. 154.
"E See infra notes 103-107.
101 See infra notes 108-109.
'02 See infra notes 110-160.
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1) Rules of Civil Procedure and Criminal Sanctions' °3
When a litigant hides, loses, or otherwise destroys evidence after beginning
discovery, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)"' 4 authorizes a judge to invoke a
hierarchy of sanctions against the non-compliant discovery party. 05 Possible
sanctions include, but are not limited to, barring the introduction of specific matters
into evidence, ordering facts established against the spoliator, barring claims or
defenses, and entering judgment against the spoliator. 0 6 The severity of these
sanctions is generally predicated upon the culpability level of the spoliator.11 7
Alternatively, the destruction of evidence will generally be covered in a
jurisdiction's "obstruction of justice" or "interference" statutes concerning the
spoliation of evidence.0 8 Other statutes prohibiting destruction of evidence are
contingent upon the spoliator's culpability and the time of destruction relevant to the
onset of litigation.109
2) Inferences or Presumptions
A separate approach utilizes adverse inferences or presumptions. This method
provides a practical solution to the problems that arise with separate civil actions. "10
In a typical spoliation case, the spoliator destroys or alters evidence which he knows
or foresees is critical to the case. The judge and jury receive evidence on the
spoliation. From this evidence, it is decided what evidentiary effect, if any, will be
given to the spoliation. The primary factor assessed in making that determination is
the motivation or intent of the spoliator."'
a) intentional spoliation
The common law doctrine, "omnia praesumunter contra spoliatoren' is
commonly used when a party intentionally destroys or alters evidence." 12 The
103 Note, Totis, supra note 66, nn. 160-171 (Rules of Civil Procedure) and nn. 184-191 (criminal sanctions).
The reader is referred to that casenote for expanded review of these topics.
"'4 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
"'i These rules have been adopted virtually unchanged in the majority of states. C. Wright, Law of Federal
Courts Section 406 (4th Ed. 1983).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
107 Note, Torts, supra note 66, nn. 167-172.
"'s Id. & n. 184.
' Id. See also Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
"oSee Smith, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (duplicative efforts - two trials with same evidence;
time and expense imposed on litigants and judicial system); Fox, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 198, 406 N.E.2d at 183
(proof of damages).
.. See Miller v. Montgomery County, 64 Md. App. 202, 494 A.2d 761 (1985).
'
2See Note, Evidence - Omnia Praesumunter Contra Spoliatorem, I ADEL. L. REV. 344 (1962). This doctrine
is aimed at intentional spoliation and does not extend to negligent spoliation cases. See infra notes 127-132.
[Vol. 22:3
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common law doctrine is premised upon several progressive inferences: (1) the
spoliator had control of the evidence; (2) the spoliator intentionally, or fraudulently,
destroyed or altered the evidence; (3) no reasonable person would destroy or alter
evidence that was favorable to their case; and (4) because the party did alter or
destroy the evidence, that evidence must have been unfavorable to their case." I 3
The doctrine's practical application was illustrated in S.C. Johnson v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. Co. 114  The plaintiff, a manufacturer, contracted with the
defendant, a railroad company, to deliver goods to the plaintiff's customer. " '5 Upon
delivery at the customer's store, the goods were claimed to be damaged." 6 The
plaintiff requested that the goods be returned to test them for the alleged damages." 7
Subsequently, the plaintiff's quality control expert tested the goods. ",8 He recorded
the results in written notes.' ' The notes were used to create a memo and then thrown
away. 
20
A suit was filed to recover the invoice price of the damaged goods.'2 ' The
plaintiff used the memo as proof of damages. 22 The trial court, after hearing the
rationale for the missing notes, inferred that the notes would have revealed a faulty
testing of the goods. 123 That adverse inference was based on the common law
doctrine. 24 Applying the common law doctrine, the trial court used a two step
process which required the court to: (1) find that the evidence was destroyed in bad
faith; and 2) conclude that the evidence, if introduced, would have been unfavorable
to that party. 25 , 'The critical element is not that the evidence was destroyed but rather
the reason for the destruction.'" 26
In summary, if the facts and circumstances presented lead to the conclusion
that the spoliator intentionally or fraudulently destroyed or altered the evidence, it
is acceptable to use an inference or presumption against the spoliator. Whether the
court chooses to enlist the aid of an inference or presumption hinges on the facts and
evidentiary setting of the case.
"M See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son. Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 198 1); 29
Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 177 (1967).
"4695 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1981).
"15 Id. at 256.
"1, Id. at 255.
117 Id.
I1 Id. at 256.
19 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 258.
1
23 Id.
1
24 Id.
125 Id.
1" Id. See also additional Circuit court cases cited therein. Id. at 259.
Winter, 1989] NOTES
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b) negligent spoliation
The adoption of inferences and presumptions in negligent spoliation cases is
a relatively new concept, and raises quite a different problem than intentional
spoliation cases.127 In negligent spoliation cases the knowledge underlying the
common law doctrine - consciousness of the unfavorable nature of the evidence - is
conspicuously absent. The very nature of the term "negligent" connotes an absence
of intent or bad faith in the actor. 28 As a result, this state of mind does not meet the
bad faith prerequisite for application of the common law doctrine.
This significant distinction has been the subject of judicial comment. In Vick
v. Texas Employment Commission, 29 the defendant- Commission lost the plaintiff's
unemployment file. 130 The plaintiff argued that an adverse inference should be
drawn against the Commission based on the lost evidence.' 31 The court, denied the
argument, stating: "Moreover, the circumstances of the act must manifest bad faith.
Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain an inference of consciousness
of a weak case."' 3 2 Thus, the common law spoliation doctrine cannot logically
extend to encompass negligent spoliation.
The leading state case in the negligent spoliation context used public policy to
support its adverse presumption.133 In Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin,
the plaintiff suffered a ruptured tubal pregnancy, which nearly caused her death.
134
The plaintiff sued the hospital. 35 She alleged that the negligent performance of a
sterilization procedure caused her pregnancy. 136 However, the plaintiff could not
prove her case because the operative notes from the surgery were missing. 1
3
The trial court granted the defendant a summary judgment.'38 The court of
appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.' 39 The appeals court adopted a
presumption scheme. 40 Under that scheme, the use of presumptions was contingent
upon the jury's finding of whether the loss of notes was intentional or accidental.' 4 '
127 See supra notes 58-65.
128 PROSSER & KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, § 28 (5th Ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser).
29 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1975).
110 Id. at 737.
131 Id.
132 Id.
'31 See supra notes 58-62.
134 id. at 596.
135 Id.
'36 Id. at 599.
137 Id. at 596.
138 Id.
'31 See Valcin v. Public Health Trust, 473 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
4O ld. at 1307.
141 Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 599.
[Vol. 22:3
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The Florida Supreme Court modified the appeals court's approach and
developed its answer to the spoliation issue. 42 The supreme court concluded that the
plaintiff was entitled to the aid of a rebuttable presumption that the notes would have
indicated negligence. '4' This presumption had two procedural effects: (1) a shift in
the burden of production, 44 and (2) a shift in the burden of persuasion.' 45
i) shift in the burden of production
The Valcin court used the policies underlying the tort doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor '46to shape its decision. "47 Res ipsa loquitor was developed to aid a plaintiff
in proving their case because a defendant has superior knowledge of the facts and
exclusive control of relevant evidence while the plaintiff has an unequal awareness
of relevant information. 14 Analogous factors are present in a spoliation case. The
Valcin court explained that the doctor's exclusive knowledge of the procedures used,
the relative ignorance of the plaintiff, and a lack of direct evidence of negligence due
to incomplete medical records compelled the burden shift as a matter of public
policy. 149
ii) shift in the burden of persuasion
The Valcin court also shifted the burden of persuasion. 50 The court reasoned
that if only the burden of production shifted, it would be too easy for the defendant
to rebut the presumption with contrary evidence and, as a result, thejury would never
receive the presumption. 5 ' This would undermine the purpose of the presumption's
existence - to aid the plaintiff in proving his case.'5 2
A vanishing presumption will not assist the plaintiff in proving his case. If the
plaintiff is in fact sufficiently "hindered" by the absence of an operative note, odds
are that the defendant's production of some evidence of nonnegligence will not place
the plaintiff in a better position. Testimony based on the selective recollection of the
surgeon and his staff would be considered 'substantial' enough to "burst the
bubble," thus keeping the presumption from the jury. Plaintiff could rarely prove
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence when the presumption has given him
1
42 Id.
143 Id.
4 Id. at 599.
"11 Id. at 600-01.
'4 PROSSER, supra note 128, at § 39.
'47 Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 600.
141 Prosser, supra note 146.
'41 Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 600.
'-Old. The Florida court had its choice of two statutory presumptions. The first shifts the burden of production.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.302(l); the second shifts the burden of persuasion pursuant to social policy. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.302(2). See Insurance Co. of State of Pa. v. Guzman's Estate, 421 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984). There is no similar codification under Kentucky law.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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nothing more than the self-serving testimony of the defendant.'53
The court explained that if the presumption were to "burst," the facts
underlying the presumption (i.e., the missing notes) would have too tenuous a
relationship to the presumed fact (i.e., negligence) to create a logical inference of
negligence.'54 Thus, if the plaintiff had little orno otherevidence of negligence, the
defendant's rebuttal evidence would, in all likelihood, result in a directed verdict for
the defendant.' 55
Based on these practical concerns, the court concluded that the best means to
ensure that the presumption would retain force in the case was to shift the burden of
persuasion.156 The burden shifted to the spoliator to prove the non-existence of the
presumed fact (i.e., negligence). 57The level of evidence needed to carry this burden
is determined by the substantive law of the case.5 8
The court was quick to state that the shifting of the burden, was an "expression
of social policy" rather than a simple procedural aid in the determination of the
case.' 59 Thus, the effect of the presumption is to compel hospitals to maintain
adequate records in patient files. 60
ANALYSIS
The logic and policy adopted in Valcin were a principle source of support for
the sixth circuit. The Welsh court held that the negligent spoliation of evidence could
prompt the use of an adverse presumption against the spoliator if the spoliation
precluded proof of the plaintiff's case.' 6 '
The Decision
The opinion concentrated on one issue: Under Kentucky law, what evidentiary
role would pre-litigation spoliation of ultimately critical evidence have on the
plaintiff's burden of proof? 16 2
The answer to this question turned on the answer to two sub-issues: (1) Is it
1
5 3 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
'
5 6 ld. The court believed this would ensure that the jury received the negligence issue in addition to evidence
of the spoliation. Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 600-01.
'
9 Id. at 601.
161 Id.
161 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248.
16 2 Id. at 1245.
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proper, under Kentucky law, to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence
against a negligent spoliator; 63 and (2) What effect will that presumption have on
the parties' burdens of proof.'t 6
1) Was the Presumption Proper?
The court's fundamental support for use of a rebuttable presumption was the
tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. ' 65 Kentucky courts approach the concept similarly
to the majority of states. 166 Whether an inference or a presumption was used in those
cases was a function of the facts in evidence. 167 Under Kentucky law, the difference
between an inference and a presumption is one of degree. 168The distinction between
the two concepts was articulated in Lee v. Tucker. 169 In Lee, a res ipsa loquitor case,
the court stated: "The terms 'inference' and 'presumption' are merely descriptive
of the weight given to circumstantial evidence as a matter of law in particular
instances... If it is accorded the dignity of a presumption, it should not be because a
wooden rule puts it in that category, but only because it is that persuasive.'
°70
Thus, the use of a presumption or inference in a case is merely a matter of the
strength of the evidence presented. If it is very persuasive, a presumption will issue;
if it merely satisfies the burden of production, an inference will arise.
As the court correctly noted, Kentucky law does allow the use of a rebuttable
presumption of negligence if the facts presented are persuasive enough.' 7' In Sadr
v. Hager Beauty, 72 the court addressed the nature and application of res ipsa
loquitor. The court stated: "This is an evidentiary doctrine which allows a jury to
infer negligence on the part of the defendant. If the inference is forceful enough it
can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence, possibly resulting in a directed
verdict." 13 This is a strong use of the res ipsa doctrine, and lends convincing support
to the court's use of a rebuttable presumption in its opinion.
2) Does the Burden of Persuasion Shift?
The questionable part of the Welsh decision concerns the shift of the burden of
persuasion.' 74 The VA argued that Kentucky law does not shift the burden of
163 Id. at 1246-48.
1
6 4 Id. at 1248-49.
"I' Id. at 1248-49. See supra notes 127-160.
" See Sadrv. Hager Beauty, 723 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Lee v. Tucker, 365 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963);
Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley, 375 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1964).
167 Lee, 365 S.W.2d at 851.
168 Id.
9 Id.
170 1 d.
171 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248.
172 723 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
'73 Id. at 887.
174 Welsh. 844 F.2d at 1248-49. It is submitted that the court was faced with a conflict between the sound logic
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persuasion in malpractice cases.175 This was premised on Kentucky's use of the
Thayer approach to presumptions.'76 The court answered this argument with a broad
statement concerning Kentucky courts' case by case approach to the effect of
inferences and presumptions.' 77
While it is true that the burden shifts in many jurisdictions, it is also true that
the burden of persuasion would not shift under Kentucky law. 78 The presumption's
existence is predicated on the res ipsa loquitor doctrine and the policies it embodies.
It is logical that in extrapolating a state law position, the court should examine how
Kentucky law deals with the burden of persuasion in res ipsa cases. 79 However, that
principle was not explicitly analyzed in the court's opinion. 8 "
a) Kentucky res ipsa cases and the burden of persuasion
Kentucky law does not shift the burden of persuasion in res ipsa loquitor
cases.'' In earlier decisions, Kentucky courts did shift the burden of persuasion, but
later decisions clearly reversed that position. 12 In fact, in Lee v. Tucker,1'3 cited by
the Welsh court to uphold its burden shift, the opinion expressly stated that although
the burden of production shifts to the defendant, the burden of persuasion remains
on the plaintiff. The court's general statement of Kentucky law in support of this
burden shift is not persuasive in the face of contradictory precedent in analogous
cases.
84
b) Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 43.01(2) states that: "The burden of proof
and policy of the Valcin decision, and existing Kentucky law on shifting the burden of persuasion. The court
chose to acopt the result of Valcin and to support it with relevant Kentucky law. In doing so, the court
overlooked case law which, at a minimum, should have been assessed in stating a diversity opinion. See infra
notes 181-184.
"I Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248. Appellant-VA argued that in malpractice cases the burden of proof (e.g.,
persuasion) does not shift from the plaintiff. Appellant's Brief at p. 8.
"I Id. The Thayer approach asserts that the only effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of production
to the adverse party, not the burden of persuasion. Once that presumption is rebutted, the trier of fact chooses
whether to infer, or not to infer, the existence of the presumed fact (e.g., negligence).
"' Id. The court stated: "This approach is not inflexible. In fact, the Kentucky approach to inferences,
presumptions, and burdens of proof pays maximum heed to the strength of the underlying proof and the facts
of a particular case." Id.
"' See Lawson, The Law of Presumptions: A Look at Confusion, Kentucky Style, 57 Ky. L.J. 7 (1968-69).
I7 ndiversity cases, courts are expected to be prudent in their exercise of discretion in predicting state law
decisions.
Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248.
' See Lawson, supra note 178; Lee, 365 S.W. 2d at 849.
"12 Lawson, supra note 178, at 30-34.
"13 Lee, 365 S.W. 2d at 852 (a wrongful death action in which the main fact question concerned which of two
drivers was operating a vehicle when it was involved in a fatal accident). See also, Bowers v. Schenley
Distillers, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1971) (the burden of persuasion does not shift from plaintiff).
"' As in Valcin, The Welsh court should have relied on social policy to shift the burden of persuasion.
However, its diversity status may have prohibited it from making such a policy statement.
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in the whole action lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given
on either side."' 85 The Welsh court stated that its presumption would not operate
unless the evidence presented in its absence would survive a directed verdict
motion. 186Logically, that means that if no evidence was produced by the plaintiff, the
presumption would not be operable, and the court would direct a verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff in Welsh had the initial burden of production. Under the
rule cited, the failure to carry that burden would result in a directed verdict for the
defendant. Thus, under the Kentucky rule the plaintiff should retain the burden of
persuasion throughout the case.
Future Effects of Welsh
1) Remarks on the Practical Operation of the Presumption
It is clear that the Welsh decision is not a haven for poorly prepared plaintiffs.
The judicial use of an inference or presumption will be determined on the facts and
evidentiary setting surrounding the spoliation. A presumption will only be necessary
in limited circumstances.
First, the plaintiff must show that the absence of the evidence impedes the
ability to prove his cause of action. 187 Second, a presumption will only operate on
those issues which are placed in doubt because of the absence of the evidence. ' 88 The
plaintiff will not be afforded an overall presumption against the spoliator. Third, the
plaintiff will have the burden of showing that the missing evidence has impeded his
case. The burden includes an explication of what the spoliated evidence would have
shown, and the relevance of that evidence to the issues in the case. 189 In malpractice
cases, such proof will undoubtedly require the use of expert testimony. A threshold
evidentiary showing will promote detailed case preparation and limit arguments for
use of a presumption.
The use of a presumption should follow the following pattern: (1) The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of production; (2) The plaintiff should put on all direct proof
of the cause of action and the spoliation; 190(3) At the close of the plaintiff's evidence,
if there is any question as to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant/spoliator
"' Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.01(2).
186 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1248.
"I Valcin, 597 So. 2d at 599. Note that this showing may result in collateral litigation because of problems
concerning the level of evidence needed to establish that a cause of action was impaired.
"I The plaintiff must make a very clear showing that the spoliated evidence: (I) could have produced
probative evidence and (2) that evidence is probative of those issues lacking sufficient evidence.
'See generally, Valcin, 597 So. 2d at 599.
" The question prompted is whether evidence of the spoliation is relevant to the action. Evidence of
spoliation "[slatisfies the minimum requirement of relevance lunder Fed. R. Evid. 401]; it has some
tendency, however small, to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable than it would otherwise be...."
Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1246 (citing Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1 st
Cir. 1982)).
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will move for a directed verdict; (4) The issue is then ripe for decision - the judge has
received evidence on the spoliation and has all the plaintiff's substantive evidence.
The judge may come to one of three conclusions: (1) the plaintiff has carried its
burden of production and deny thedefendant's motion; (2) the plaintiff has failed to
carry its burden of production but the absence of the spoliated evidence is the cause
of the deficiency (the judge will then weigh the circumstances surrounding the
spoliation and the alleged probity of the missing evidence to determine what decision
to render); or (3) the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of production but the
missing evidence would not be sufficient to create a question of fact and grant the
directed verdict.
2) Hospital Administration
The effects of several holdings involving negligent spoliation have had their
impact on hospitals.' 9' It is apparent that hospital administrators should review their
administrative and personnel procedures related to recordkeeping, patient care, and
surgical procedures in light of these decisions. The amount of information that is
present in health care facilities is enormous, making the potential impact of these
decisions very burdensome. Therefore, constructive management of health care
facilities requires affirmative steps to eliminate the incidental sources of litigation
problems. The following suggestions focus attention on information processing
functions. The objective is to efficiently record, access, and store information that
is potentially determinative in a malpractice action.
First, hospital administrators should review recordkeeping procedures on all
levels, including office administration, patient charts and operative notes. The key
is to ensure that all information is recorded, placed in the appropriate location and
held for future reference. The promulgation of regulations concerning the type of
records needed in particular situations, who is responsible for making them, and
where they are to be kept is imperative.
Second, all employees and health care practitioners must be made aware of all
relevant regulations concerning recordkeeping and their responsibilities. The focus
is awareness of potentially useful information. It is the administration's responsi-
bility to inform employees and practitioners of their obligations under the law and
under facility procedures.
Finally, establish an internal check system that will allow early detection of
information loss in the facility. Such a system will ensure the safety of documents
and allow resolution of information processing problems before large amounts of
information are misplaced, lost, or destroyed.
. See Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1239; Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 596; Fox, 84 III. App. 3d at 744, 406 N.E. 2d at 178.
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CONCLUSION
The spoliation of evidence is not a problem that will go away on its own. Courts
must decide whether to act affirmatively against the problem or watch it grow. Many
jurisdictions are taking affirmative positions.
The positions taken in Valcin and Welsh are illustrations of a strong, but not
oppressive, position against spoliation. The use of a rebuttable presumption
"occupies a middle ground - it neither simply condones the defendant's negligent
spoliation of evidence at the plaintiff's expense nor imposes an unduly harsh and
absolute liability upon a merely negligent party."' 9 2
In the future, each state court will take a position in reaction to the spoliation
that occurs in its forum. When this occurs, the legal system will have supported
Newton's theory: for each action, there is indeed an equal and opposite reaction.
DANIEL L. BELL
192 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1249.
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